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Abstract 
In philosophy and political theory, divisions come and go, but some persist despite being 
obviously problematic. The analytic and Continental divide is one such division. In political 
philosophy and political theory, the division has been particularly pronounced. Analytic and 
Continental thinkers are divided not only over substantial issues, but also over the very nature 
of political theorising. In spite of this fundamental nature, theorists often seem to assume that, 
as a division, the analytic/Continental divide requires no explanation. We suggest that, as a 
central division within political theory, and despite being acknowledged as problematic for 
quite some time, it has persisted because it has not been adequately examined. Once 
examined, the division turns out to be operationally weaker than it once was. In recent years, 
there has been a growing interest in engaging thinkers from the other side. This has been 
accompanied by a corresponding tendency, among both analytic and Continental 
philosophers and political thinkers, to reflect on the nature of their own tradition and 
‘philosophy’. Both traditions have entered a self-conscious period of meta-reflection. Such 
questioning indicates the possibility of transformation within both groups, in the absence of 
settled frameworks and divisions. However, it is also clear that such signs are the beginning 
of the possibility of a new relation rather than a sign of the eclipse of the division. The 
continued institutional separation and the space between their respective philosophical 
vocabularies suggest that, while the time is ripe for work here, there is still much to be done. 
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In philosophy and political theory, divisions come and go, but some persist despite being 
obviously problematic. The analytic and Continental divide is one such division.2 Coming out 
of debates between analytic theory and phenomenology in the 1950s (Glendinning, 2008: 71), 
the divide has been read backwards into history; continues to structure academic discourse, 
publishing and appointments in philosophy and political theory; and has even underwritten 
methodological differences between different camps in sociology, history, anthropology, 
literary theory, law and many other fields. It has thus had a fundamental impact on academic 
thought and practice. 
In political theory, these effects have been particularly pronounced. Analytic and 
Continental thinkers are divided not only over substantial issues, but also over the very nature 
of political theorising. Those working within one tradition often view with scepticism the 
work and conclusions of theorists within the other tradition, and the two traditions often 
speak past one another disagreeing about such fundamental categories as theorising, politics 
and the political in the first place. Consequently, analytic and Continental political theory, 
and the associated division between liberal normative theory and post-structuralism, operate 
with different understandings of the role of, and relationship between, philosophy and 
politics. 
In spite of this fundamental nature, theorists often seem to assume that, as a division, 
the analytic/Continental divide requires no explanation. It is immediately understood when 
invoked by those in the field, and most theorists, if not readily identifying with one or the 
other side of the division, implicitly assume or employ it in their choice of questions and 
sources. Equally, when it is engaged there is little consensus over the nature of the division 
and what actually divides ‘analytic’ from ’Continental’. We suggest that, as a central division 
within political theory, and despite being acknowledged as problematic for quite some time 
and in many ways,3 it has persisted because it has not been adequately examined. 
This characterization is not meant to side-line the productive discussions of the 
division which have occurred and upon which many of the present contributions build. 
However, these accounts have often been problematic in one of two ways (Chase et al. 2011). 
First, they have often ‘essentialized’ the division to one degree or another. Here analytic and 
Continental are cast as distinct and mutually exclusive categories, characterized by 
fundamentally different approaches, methods and ideas. Numerous accounts of the central 
aspect of this division have been offered. Simon Critchley (2001) draws a line between 
analytic ‘problems’ and Continental ‘historicity’; David Cooper (1994) distinguishes between 
the naturalism of analytic philosophy and the anti-scientism of Continental philosophy; and 
Stephen K White and Robert Pippin divides analytics and Continentals according to whether 
they subscribe to the project of modernity or focus on identifying its malignancies. 
There are two problems with the essentialized approach. Beyond the common concern 
that these various characterizations might ignore or marginalize important work within these 
traditions that does not fit within these typologies, they also tend to only reinforce the divide. 
They come with the implication that there is no need or possibility of engaging with the other 
side. Each account tends to depend upon programmatic statements of what philosophy is. 
Such an approach precludes the possibility of productive work across the division. 
Second, in contrast to those essentialist accounts, there is a growing tendency to 
deflate the analytic and Continental divide, both in wider philosophy and in political thought. 
Here, it is brushed aside as an essentialist relic,4 and real attempts are made for common 
conversation, for instance, the employment of a figure from the other side. In this latter case 
though, when the other side is engaged, the tendency is to do so only on one’s own set of 
terms and questions. You rarely find enquiries engaging the other framework as such. For 
example, agonistic critiques of John Rawls, which do work across the division, still fail to 
delineate the nature of this opposition (e.g., Honig 1993). Especially within political theory 
and philosophy, there has been little reflection on the different modes of theorising as 
different modes of theorising, and no attempt to employ such differences to advance the 
common project of political theorising on the whole.5 
And yet, the division is operationally weaker than it once was. In recent years, there 
has been a growing interest in engaging thinkers from the other side. This has been 
accompanied by a corresponding tendency, among both analytic and Continental 
philosophers and political thinkers, to reflect on the nature of their own tradition and 
‘philosophy’. Both traditions seem to have now entered a self-conscious period of meta-
reflection (e.g., Arnold Forthcoming; Chase et al. 2011). Such questioning indicates the 
possibility of transformation within both groups, in the absence of settled frameworks and 
divisions. However, it is also clear that such signs are the beginning of the possibility of a 
new relation rather than a sign of the eclipse of the division. The continued institutional 
separation – in terms of employment, publishing and research activities – and the space 
between their respective philosophical vocabularies suggest that, while the time is ripe for 
work here, there is still much to be done. 
This special issue begins to rectify these omissions through several approaches. First, 
several of the contributions here offer new ways of understanding the division and its 
particular form within political theory and philosophy. In their contribution, Thomas J. 
Donahue and Paulina Ochoa Espejo, connect the divide to a broad typology of the various 
styles of addressing problems within political theory. This allows them both to identify the 
increasing areas of methodological overlap that have developed in recent literatures, and the 
continued areas of division. Jonathan Floyd and David Owen’s contributions also offer 
reconstructed understandings of the division. Floyd centres the division on an unarticulated 
disagreement about human nature, from which different (and problematic) conceptions of 
theorising and method flow. Owen focuses on the methodological division between these two 
groups in terms of the ‘structural problematics’ they confront. While analytic theorists 
attempt to generate reasons that can support fundamental norms (the guidance problem), 
Continental theorists are oriented to critically assessing existing practices of reasoning (the 
critique problem). 
Importantly, Floyd and Owen also look past merely re-framing the divide, to offer the 
bones of approaches that go beyond these divisions; what they call ‘normative behaviourism’ 
and ‘activist political theory’ respectively.  In this, they anticipate the second cluster of 
contributions in this special issue. Stephen K. White, Clayton Chin and Paul Patton offer 
readings of groups and emerging dynamics that work across and destabilize the analytic-
Continental divide. White re-reads Habermas’ communicative action paradigm to illustrate its 
complementarity with both the analytic and Continental frameworks. This importantly 
situates a tradition that has always stood in an awkward relation to this division, while 
offering a fresh take on Habermas’ work that addresses some of its most common criticisms. 
Chin’s contribution connects emerging dynamics from several clusters of literature that are 
all making similar moves toward situated, social-practice based methodologies for political 
thought. Drawing together elements of new realism, genealogy and pragmatism in what he 
dubs a ‘situated turn’, he then argues that the pragmatism of Richard Rorty offers unique 
resources for a methodological pluralist approach to contemporary political theory that 
enables moving across the division. Finally, Patton’s contribution further develops his recent 
work on Foucault and Rawls. In a way that overlaps with Owen’s typology, Patton argues 
that  analytic and Continental political philosophy prioritize the normative and descriptive 
differently, and, with this in mind, he employs an analysis of the work of Michel Foucault 
and John Rawls to argue for the complementarity of these projects for political theory.  
In this manner, the first three contributions (Donahue and Ochoa Espejo, Floyd and 
Owen) in this special issue offer new and insightful typologies of the division, ones that 
provide real insight without essentializing. The later three contributions (White, Chin and 
Patton) argue for particular areas of overlap and the consequent opportunities for productive 
work across the analytic-Continental divide without deflating its importance. Together, they 
offer us dramatic new insights into the limitations and potentialities of political thought 
today. 
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Notes 
                                                             
1 This special issue grew out of a May 2013 Conference, held in the School of Politics and 
International Relations at Queen Mary, University of London, entitled ‘Continental and 
Analytical Political Theory: An Insurmountable Divide?’ We would like to thank all the 
participants there for the richness of the discussion and its direct and indirect contributions to 
this special issue. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
2 For general introductions, see Chase et al. 2011; Gutting 2012; Leiter (No Date); Prado 
2003. We have chosen not to standardise the use of terms the use of terms like theory and 
philosophy, and analytic and analytical across the contributions to the special issue. The 
exception is to capitalise Continental and not analytic/al. 
3 Bernard Williams (1995: 66) makes perhaps the strongest objection to the analytic-
Continental divide when he observes that it is based upon a conflation of methodological and 
geographical categories, ‘as though one classified cars into front-wheel drive and Japanese’.  
4 The archetypal example of such deflation is Glendinning 2006.  
5 There are exceptions though: some political theorists have engaged the divide, for instance 
Patton (2006) and White (2011), both of whom are included here and build on their earlier 
accounts. 
